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Abstract
Organizational research advocates that firms balance exploration and exploitation, yet it acknowledges
inherent challenges in reconciling these opposing activities. To overcome these challenges, such
research suggests that firms establish organizational separation between exploring and exploiting units
or engage in temporal separation whereby they oscillate between exploration and exploitation over time.
Nevertheless, these approaches entail resource allocation trade-offs and conflicting organizational
routines, which may undermine organizational performance as firms seek to balance exploration and
exploitation within a discrete field of organizational activity (i.e., domain). We posit that firms can
overcome such impediments and enhance their performance if they explore in one domain while
exploiting in another. Studying the alliance portfolios of software firms, we demonstrate that firms do not
typically benefit from balancing exploration and exploitation within the function domain (technology
versus marketing and production alliances) and structure domain (new versus prior partners).
Nevertheless, firms that balance exploration and exploitation across these domains by engaging in
research and development alliances while collaborating with their prior partners, or alternatively, by
forming marketing and production alliances while seeking new partners, gain in profits and market value.
Moreover, we reveal that increases in firm size that exacerbate resource allocation trade-offs and routine
rigidity reinforce the benefits of balance across domains and the costs of balance within domains. Our
domain separation approach offers new insights into how firms can benefit from balancing exploration
and exploitation. What matters is not simply whether firms balance exploration and exploitation in their
alliance formation decisions but the means by which they achieve such balance.
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Balance Within and Across Domains:
The Performance Implications of Exploration and Exploitation in Alliances
Abstract
Organizational research advocates that firms balance exploration and exploitation yet acknowledges
inherent challenges in reconciling these opposing activities. To overcome these challenges, such research
suggests that firms establish organizational separation between exploring and exploiting units or engage
in temporal separation whereby they oscillate between exploration and exploitation over time.
Nevertheless, these approaches entail resource allocation tradeoffs and conflicting organizational routines,
which may undermine organizational performance as firms seek to balance exploration and exploitation
within a discrete field of organizational activity (i.e., domain). We posit that firms can overcome such
impediments and enhance their performance if they explore in one domain while exploiting in another.
Studying the alliance portfolios of software firms, we demonstrate that firms do not typically benefit from
balancing exploration and exploitation within the function domain (technology versus marketing and
production alliances) and structure domain (new versus prior partners). Nevertheless, firms that balance
exploration and exploitation across these domains by engaging in R&D alliances while collaborating with
their prior partners, or alternatively by forming marketing and production alliances while seeking new
partners, gain in profits and market value. Moreover, we reveal that increases in firm size that exacerbate
resource allocation tradeoffs and routine rigidity reinforce the benefits of balance across domains and the
costs of balance within domains. Our domain separation approach offers new insights into how firms can
benefit from balancing exploration and exploitation. What matters is not simply whether firms balance
exploration and exploitation in their alliance formation decisions but the means by which they achieve
such balance.
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Introduction
The notion of exploration and exploitation has received much attention in management research since it
was introduced by March (1991: 71): “Exploration includes things captured by terms such as search,
variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, innovation. Exploitation includes such
things as refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, implementation, execution.” According to
Levinthal and March (1993), exploration enables the creation of new knowledge, whereas exploitation
supports the refinement and use of existing knowledge. Prior research has advocated that “maintaining an
appropriate balance between exploration and exploitation is a primary factor in system survival and
prosperity” (March 1991: 71), underscoring the positive performance implications of such balance.
Surprisingly, despite extensive discussion of the merits of balance, with few exceptions (He and Wong
2004; Sidhu, Commandeur, and Volberda 2007), empirical evidence of performance effects has been
mostly furnished by anecdotal case studies (e.g., Tushman and O’Reilly 1996), offering limited support to
this balance hypothesis. In this study we suggest that prior research has underestimated the organizational
impediments associated with firms’ efforts to balance exploration and exploitation, and that the
performance implications of such balance depend on the means by which firms pursue this balance.
Established approaches for balancing exploration and exploitation, namely temporal separation and
organizational separation, impose managerial challenges and organizational impediments that may offset
the payoffs from balancing these two activities. Rooted in the notion of bounded rationality and sequential
attention to divergent goals (Cyert and March 1963), temporal separation entails oscillating between
exploration and exploitation over time (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004), so that firms explore at one point
in time and then exploit at another (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997). Nevertheless, such transitions are not
trivial, and their implementation requires adaptability and agility. In turn, literature on the ambidextrous
organization has advocated simultaneous pursuit of exploration and exploitation via organizational
separation, whereby firms build dual governance into their organization (Duncan 1976) with
organizational units exclusively dedicated to either activity (Benner and Tushman 2003; O’Reilly and
Tushman 2004; Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). Hence, this approach seemingly overcomes the tradeoff
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between these conflicting activities: “the learning, resources, and routines necessary for exploration and
exploitation are different. As such, they may be delegated within a group or organization so that both can
be achieved simultaneously” (Gupta, Smith, and Shalley 2006: 696). Nevertheless, maintaining separate
organizational units creates operational redundancy and merely relegates the challenge of coordinating
exploration and exploitation to the top management team. In the current study we contend that these
organizational impediments can outweigh the benefits of balance, so that firms that simultaneously
explore and exploit may suffer negative performance consequences. Furthermore, we advance the domain
separation approach that relieves firms from some inherent tradeoffs associated with these established
approaches, and thus can enhance firms’ abilities to successfully balance exploration and exploitation.
We maintain that the limited empirical support for March’s balance hypothesis can be ascribed to the
attempts of prior research to study the implications of balance between exploration and exploitation only
within a single domain, i.e., within a discrete field of organizational activity, such as in the function
domain wherein a firm can either engage in innovation or commercialization of technologies. This mode
of balance is analogous to a seesaw that seeks a delicate equilibrium between conflicting loads imposed
on its opposite sides. Thus, firms that follow temporal or organizational separation face resource
allocation tradeoffs and need to maintain conflicting routines within a particular domain. In contrast, we
consider how firms can balance their exploration and exploitation tendencies not only within but also
across discrete domains which together describe the organizational activity in question (e.g., Lavie and
Rosenkopf 2006; Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001). Acknowledging the prevalence of multiple domains in
which firms can engage in exploratory and exploitative activities, such domain separation does not entail
separate organizational units with distinctive sets of conflicting routines. Instead, it offers flexibility for
firms to pursue exploration in one domain and exploitation in the other as long as balance is maintained
across domains. We expect such balance to enhance firm performance by maintaining both novelty and
efficiency while dislodging the firm from the inherent tradeoffs between exploration and exploitation. The
benefits of balance across domains are expected to intensify with firm size because operating on a large
scale entails more rigid routines, which makes it more difficult to reconcile discrepancies within domains.
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Our study examines these predictions in the context of alliance portfolios. Firms rely on alliances
both to explore new opportunities and to leverage existing skills (Koza and Lewin 1998 2000; Rothaermel
2001). In particular, scholars have noted with respect to the value chain function of alliances that
exploration enables the acquisition of new capabilities (Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman 1996), whereas
exploitation supports product commercialization (Rothaermel 2001). Prior research indicates that firms
tend to balance exploration and exploitation in their alliance portfolios (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006).
However, the only evidence on the performance effects of balance reveals reduced resource accumulation
as a result of structural balance in a firm’s tendency to explore new alliance relationships versus exploit
prior ties to partners (Lin, Yang, and Demirkan 2007). The implications of balance within and across
these domains have thus remained ambiguous. Prior research does not fully account for balancing effects,
since it typically limits its investigation to a single domain.
We conceptualize the domain separation approach based on the well-established distinction between
the function domain (knowledge-generating versus knowledge-leveraging alliances) and the structure
domain (new versus prior partners). Even though one may specify an alliance relationship along various
dimensions such as industry focus or partners’ cultural fit, prior research on exploration and exploitation
in alliances has almost exclusively focused on the function and structure domains, identifying them as
most relevant for alliance formation decisions (e.g., Beckman, Haunschild, and Phillips 2004; Grant and
Baden-Fuller 2004; Koza and Lewin 1998; Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006; Lin et al. 2007; Park et al. 2002;
Rothaermel 2001; Rothaermel and Deeds 2004). We argue that in the context of a firm’s alliances,
resource allocation tradeoffs and conflicting organizational routines result in negative performance
implications when firms balance exploration and exploitation within the function and structure domains.
In turn, domain separation can serve as an effective approach for achieving balance between exploration
and exploitation. Our approach reconciles opposing perspectives on the merits of balancing exploration
and exploitation by revealing that some forms of balance are more effective than others.
Studying the alliances of U.S.-based software firms during 1990-2001, we furnish evidence on the
performance effects of balance within and across the function and structure domains. In accordance with
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the domain separation approach, we find negative effects of balance within the structure domain
(tendency to seek proportional representation of new versus prior partners in an alliance portfolio) on
firms’ market value and net profit. In turn, balancing exploration and exploitation across the function and
structure domains (e.g., forming R&D alliances yet engaging in recurrent alliances with prior partners)
improves these performance outcomes. Furthermore, we demonstrate that as firms grow, balancing within
domains becomes less effective while balancing across domains becomes a more effective means for
enhancing performance. These findings shed new light on March’s balance hypothesis and contribute to
emerging research on ambidexterity and alliance portfolios.

Theoretical Background
Interfirm alliances enable firms to share and exchange resources for the purpose of jointly developing or
providing technologies, products, or services (Gulati 1998). In line with Levinthal and March (1993),
Koza and Lewin (1998) suggested that firms may establish alliances to jointly exploit their existing
knowledge or to explore new opportunities. Most prior research has followed this distinction between
exploration and exploitation in alliances based on the value chain function that alliances serve (e.g., Park,
Chen, and Gallagher 2002; Rothaermel 2001; Rothaermel and Deeds 2004). According to this tradition, a
firm that collaborates with its partners in upstream activities of the value chain, such as R&D initiatives
that may result in innovative technologies or products, engages in exploration in the function domain. In
contrast, a firm that uses alliances for performing downstream activities of the value chain, such as
commercialization or application of existing technologies, pursues exploitation in that domain. Hence,
scholars have associated a firm’s tendency to acquire and generate new knowledge through exploration
with R&D alliances, contrasting them with marketing and production alliances that serve for exploitation
by leveraging, integrating, and implementing existing knowledge (Grant and Baden-Fuller 2004; Lavie
and Rosenkopf 2006; Park et al. 2002; Rothaermel 2001; Rothaermel and Deeds 2004).
Besides the function domain, recent research on alliances has acknowledged efforts to explore and
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exploit in the structure domain (e.g., Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006; Lin et al. 2007).1 Exploration in the
structure domain refers to a firm’s tendency to seek opportunities by forming alliances with new partners
that lack prior ties to the firm, wherein the firm expands its network boundaries beyond the immediate
structure of its alliance portfolio. Thus, in accordance with March’s (1991) notion of exploration,
exploration in the structure domain creates new opportunities but increases risk and uncertainty because
the firm cannot rely on prior experience with its new partners. In turn, exploitation in the structure domain
refers to a firm’s efforts to consolidate its alliance portfolio by forming recurrent alliances with a select
group of partners with whom the firm has established ties for accessing resources that reside within its
alliance portfolio (Beckman et al. 2004; Lin et al. 2007). Per March’s (1991) notion of exploitation,
alliances with prior partners reinforce the firm’s current knowledge base (Beckman et al. 2004), leverage
its partnering experience (Hoang and Rothaermel 2005) and rely on accumulated trust to enhance the
predictability and reliability of collaboration (Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, and Chuang 2005; Chung, Singh,
and Lee 2000; Gulati 1995b; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Li and Rowley 2002). Hence, firms’ tendencies to
explore or exploit manifest in both the function and structure domains of alliances.
Prior research has identified some antecedents to firms’ tendencies to engage in exploration and
exploitation within either the function or the structure domains of alliance formation. Such tendencies
may lead to imbalance between exploration and exploitation within each domain. Some studies identify
industry conditions such as market uncertainty as drivers of either exploration or exploitation (Beckman
et al. 2004; Rothaermel 2001). Other studies consider firm-specific antecedents of exploration and
exploitation tendencies (Park et al., 2002; Rothaermel and Deeds 2004), yet little is known about what
guides firms’ decisions to explore versus exploit in their alliance formation decisions. In attempt to
reconcile inconsistent findings and explain firms’ attempts to balance exploration and exploitation in

1

In addition to the function and structure domains, Lavie and Rosenkopf (2006) refer to exploration and exploitation
in the attribute domain, considering how the characteristics of partners differ from those of the firm’s prior partners.
Together, these three domains effectively describe an alliance by considering the value chain function of the
alliance, the structural position of the partners, and their relative attributes. However, the characteristics by which
partners differ are themselves multidimensional and may reveal inconsistent patterns. We thus exclude the attribute
domain and focus on the function and structure domains in accordance with established research on exploration and
exploitation in alliances.
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alliances, Lavie and Rosenkopf (2006) demonstrated that partnering experience leads to exploration in the
function domain (shifting from marketing and production alliances to R&D alliances) and exploitation in
the structure domain (shifting from new to prior partners). They further reveal patterns of slack-induced
search whereby profitable firms engage in more extensive function exploration, and document path
dependence in exploration versus exploitation tendencies within each domain. Finally, they show how
firms balance these tendencies across domains by shifting from existing to new partners while engaging
in more marketing and production alliances as opposed to R&D alliances. Nevertheless, these studies do
not uncover the performance implications of such balance.
In this regard, prior research suggests that exploration and exploitation are both essential for
organizational performance. Whereas exploitation leverages existing knowledge and relationships,
exploration generates new knowledge and social capital. Firms that engage in exploration but neglect
exploitation may end up with undeveloped ideas and unrealized opportunities. In turn, overinvestment in
exploitation at the expense of exploration may exhaust firms’ opportunities and render their competencies
obsolete (March 1991). Hence, firms that simultaneously explore and exploit are expected to achieve
superior performance relative to firms that emphasize one activity at the expense of the other (Tushman
and O’Reilly 1996). This balance hypothesis has served scholars in conjecturing about the merits of
balancing exploration and exploitation in alliance portfolios (e.g., Lin et al. 2007).
According to prior research, alliances extend a firm’s boundaries so it can engage in value chain
activities that are otherwise unavailable given its internal resources and market opportunities (Dyer 2000;
Gulati 1999; Lavie 2006). A firm that restricts its portfolio to R&D alliances forgoes opportunities that
cannot be efficiently tapped by its internal organization as a result of limited market access. In turn, a firm
that limits its portfolio to marketing and production alliances may fail to internalize external knowledge
that cannot be developed internally (Hagedoorn 1993; Mowery et al. 1996; Rothaermel 2001). Thus, prior
research suggests that an alliance portfolio that overemphasizes either exploration or exploitation within
the function domain is sub-optimal (Hoffmann 2007). Similarly, alliances with new partners introduce
new opportunities, diverse information, and novel ideas beyond the reach of a firm’s immediate alliance
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portfolio (Stuart 2000). In turn, recurrent alliances with prior partners leverage interfirm trust and
established routines for tight coordination, joint problem solving, and conflict resolution (Gulati 1995a;
Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt 2000; Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter 2000; Uzzi 1996). Hence, prior
research suggests that a firm that fails to balance exploration and exploitation within the structure domain
may not be able to fully capitalize on the benefits of its alliance portfolio, and its performance may suffer
as a result (Lin et al. 2007). Despite the compelling rationale of the balance hypothesis, empirical
evidence in support of this premise has been limited at best. We next argue that resource allocation
tradeoffs and conflicting organizational routines may offset the benefits of balance within domains. We
then propose that balance across domains generates more favorable performance implications in alliances.

Hypotheses
Despite the potential merits of balance in the function and structure domains, exploration and exploitation
are often at odds, requiring firms to manage tradeoffs when pursuing these activities simultaneously.
These tradeoffs are instigated by competition for scarce resources that support both activities and by the
fact that these activities rely on distinctive modes of organizational behavior and routines (March 1991).
The self-reinforcing nature of these routines strengthens the dominant activity while driving out the other
(Levinthal and March 1993; March 1991). Consequently, most firms would find it challenging to
reconcile the tension between exploration and exploitation (Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). Firms that
strive to balance exploration and exploitation encounter cultural, structural, demographic, and process
incongruities and also face conflicts between their exploring and exploiting units (Abernathy 1978;
Benner and Tushman 2003; Tushman, Anderson, and O’Reilly 1997). The increased demand for
operational resources and the coordination challenges imposed by conflicting routines can thus impair
performance. A firm’s use of alliances enables it to attenuate internal resource allocation constraints by
sharing resource investments with partners. However, similar tension between exploration and
exploitation emerges when the firm attempts to balance these activities in its alliance portfolio. Resource
allocation constraints and organizational conflicts merely shift from internal units to the alliance
organization, yet remain detrimental.
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In particular, a firm may face resource allocation tradeoffs when balancing exploration and
exploitation within the function domain. Whereas R&D alliances entail risky investments in new
technologies, marketing and production alliances commercialize existing knowledge in search of
immediate payoffs. Thus, the firm faces a dilemma in supporting these distinctive types of alliances in its
portfolio given the disparity in their objectives and associated risk levels. Supporting collaborative R&D
initiatives may come at the expense of leveraging established technologies with marketing partners and
enhancing operational efficiency. The tradeoffs in allocating resources to R&D alliances versus marketing
and production alliances may diminish the effectiveness of the alliance portfolio and its responsiveness to
emerging market conditions, and thus undermine its contribution to firm performance.
Moreover, organizational routines that support knowledge-generating alliances contradict those that
underlie knowledge-leveraging alliances throughout the alliance lifecycle. Specifically, the former favor
collaborating with innovative and flexible partners whereas the latter favor engaging partners that
underscore productivity and stability. Additionally, function exploration entails search, evaluation, and
internalization of external knowledge (Zahra and George 2002), whereas function exploitation
necessitates integration, application, and refinement of existing knowledge (Grant and Baden-Fuller
2004). These conflicting processes lead to inconsistencies as a firm seeks to balance exploration and
exploitation in its alliance portfolio. Finally, the criteria for evaluating the outcomes of these two types of
alliances differ, which can lead to improper feedback and negative learning effects across alliances. A
balance-seeking firm may fail to develop relevant partnering routines because departure from a consistent
pattern of repetitive behavior impedes the evolution of organizational routines (Nelson and Winter 1982;
Zollo, Reuer, and Singh 2002). Such disparity in the alliance portfolio may also result in misapplication
of partnering routines that fit one type of alliance but not the other. Hence, balancing exploration and
exploitation in the function domain can impair firm performance.
Similarly, in the structure domain, firms encounter tradeoffs in resource allocation and inconsistent
organizational routines when seeking to balance formation of new ties with elaboration of existing ties
(Beckman et al. 2004; Lin et al. 2007). Whereas recurrent alliances with prior partners entail local search
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and the nurturing of strong ties with a small set of partners, alliances with new partners encourage
boundary spanning and the casting of a broad net using indirect contacts and referrals (Burt 2000;
Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001). Because local search and boundary spanning require distinctive orientations,
a firm that balances exploration and exploitation within the structure domain must develop conflicting
partner selection routines, which impairs specialization and attenuates the efficiency of alliance formation.
The potential substitution between resources offered by established partners and those furnished by
prospective partners can lead to conflict and sub-optimal partner selection. Furthermore, whereas
alliances with new partners often rely on formal governance mechanisms such as explicit contractual
safeguards, alliances with prior partners can leverage informal agreements and interfirm trust (Gulati and
Singh 1998; Reuer and Arino 2007). A firm that balances exploration and exploitation needs to juggle
these conflicting governance modes and may fail to develop consistent practices for managing its
alliances. Misapplication of partnering routines can then lead to opportunistic behavior when blindly
trusting new partners or to inefficiency and tension when enforcing formal governance in alliances with
long-time partners. Partners may also become dissatisfied with preferential treatment or inconsistent
arrangements employed in otherwise equivalent alliances. These caveats compromise the firm’s ability to
benefit from simultaneous engagement in exploration and exploitation within domains. Consequently, a
firm that balances exploration and exploitation within the function and structure domains may undermine
the effectiveness of its alliance portfolio and suffer negative performance consequences.
H1. Firm performance will be negatively related to balance between exploration and exploitation within
(a) the function and (b) the structure domains of alliance formation decisions.
We have noted that balancing exploration and exploitation within domains incurs inherent
organizational tradeoffs and impediments that may offset innovativeness and productivity gains from
alliance portfolios. Nevertheless, a firm can avoid these challenges and still enjoy the benefits of balance
by exploring in one domain while exploiting in another. For example, a firm may form recurrent R&D
alliances (engaging in function exploration) with existing partners (engaging in structure exploitation) to
generate new knowledge while leveraging familiarity and established partnering routines. Alternatively, it
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can extend its market reach for existing products (engaging in function exploitation) by signing up many
new resellers (engaging in structure exploration). Such balance across domains generates important
benefits and at the same time transcends the impediments associated with balance within domains.
By focusing on R&D alliances and working with familiar partners, or instead, concentrating on
collaborative marketing and production while seeking new partners, the firm can simultaneously generate
new opportunities and leverage its accumulated experience while reducing its exposure to excessive risk.
Following March’s (1991) broad notions of exploration and exploitation, the exploratory and exploitative
activities need not take place in a single domain as long as the firm finds ways to embrace both
established and emerging stimuli in its alliance portfolio. Hence, the firm can balance exploration and
exploitation while supporting specialization within each domain. Specifically, the firm can develop
functional expertise in either collaborative R&D or joint marketing and production activities and thus
enhance the effectiveness of its alliances. At the same time it can nurture distinctive relational capabilities
(Kale, Dyer, and Singh 2002) for collaborating with a coherent group of established partners or rather
specialize in managing an evolving portfolio of new partners. Hence, the firm can seek opportunities by
investing either in new knowledge development or in the heterogeneity of partners in its portfolio. In
addition, it can enhance efficiency by either leveraging its established relationships or its experience with
existing knowledge. Furthermore, by exploring in one domain and exploiting in the other such firm can
attenuate certain types of risk and uncertainty associated with its alliance portfolio. It can decide whether
to reduce technical risk in new technology development or rather avoid managerial challenges associated
with ties to unfamiliar partners. The ability to decide in which domain to engage in exploration rather than
exploitation supports the firm’s efforts to specialize and thus improves the performance of its alliance
portfolio. Therefore, a firm that balances exploration and exploitation across the function and structure
domains can reduce risk and uncertainty while gaining efficiency and social capital which eventually
contribute to firm performance (Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman 2000; Lee, Lee, and Pennings 2001).
Balancing exploration and exploitation across domains can not only provide important benefits but
also eliminate certain organizational impediments associated with balance within domains. Assuming that
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the function and structure domains of alliance portfolios are independent, balancing exploration and
exploitation across these domains enables a firm to attenuate inconsistency of behavioral patterns and
avoid resource allocation tradeoffs that prevail when operating within a particular domain. Circumventing
internal coordination of conflicting activities within each domain economizes on the firm’s investments in
distinctive partnering routines and facilitates the use of consistent routines for managing its alliances in
each domain. Consequently, the firm can eliminate inherent tradeoffs and conflicts associated with
reliance on inconsistent partnering routines. For example, a firm’s practices for testing emerging
technologies and assimilating partners’ knowledge in the course of joint R&D alliances do not counter the
firm’s investments in relation-specific assets, the development of interfirm trust, and the use of informal
governance mechanisms, which are essential in repeated alliances with prior partners (Gulati 1995a).
Hence, balance across domains enables the firm to simultaneously nurture organizational routines that
regulate exploitation in one domain while supporting exploration in another (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006).
It enables the firm to overcome some organizational impediments that emerge when attempting to balance
exploration and exploitation within domains while still enabling it to enjoy the benefits of balance in its
alliance portfolio. Balancing exploration and exploitation across domains thus enhances firm performance.
H2. Firm performance will be positively related to balance between exploration and exploitation across
the function and structure domains of alliance formation decisions.
We have thus far argued that balancing exploration and exploitation within domains enables a firm to
generate new sources of knowledge and social capital while leveraging existing knowledge and
relationships. However, such balance entails tradeoffs in resource allocation and internal conflicts
associated with the use of inconsistent organizational routines. Consequently, balance within domains
should undermine firm performance whereas balance across domains, which circumvents these
impediments, is expected to produce positive performance effects. In accordance with our conjectures, we
would expect such performance implications to intensify as resource allocation tradeoffs and conflicting
routines exacerbate. We argue next that these tradeoffs and conflicting routines exacerbate as the firm
grows in size, thus making the balance within domains less beneficial whereas the performance
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implications of balance across domains become more favorable.
First, balancing exploration and exploitation within domains creates escalating resource allocation
tradeoffs as a firm grows in size. At first glance, it may seem that a growing firm becomes less sensitive
to resource allocation constraints (Lin et al., 2007); however, the availability of internal resources makes
such firm less dependent on alliances as a primary source of resources (Lavie 2006). Specifically, smaller
firm size implies limited reliance on internal value chain activities and greater dependence on alliance
partners for both exploratory R&D activities and exploitative marketing or production activities. The
ability to create social capital by maintaining both new and established relationships with partners is more
central to a firm’s reputation and eventual performance when it possess limited assets (Gulati and Higgins
2003; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels 1999). As the firm grows in size it becomes more self-reliant and better
able to carry out its internal operations, so that it is less vested in its alliance portfolio and less dependent
on its alliance partners for furnishing network resources. An increase in firm size represents investments
in assets owned by the firm’s internal organization, which could limit the availability of resources for
supporting external collaborative engagements. Hence, the accumulation of internal assets may
undermine the vitality of the alliance portfolio, thus exacerbating resource allocation tradeoffs in the
portfolio. In particular, competition for resources that support both exploration and exploitation within the
function or structure domains intensifies when a firm owns a rich resource base that can serve for carrying
out these activities internally rather than through alliances. Therefore, balance within alliance domains
imposes increasing challenges as the firm grows in size.
Second, organizational routines that support opposing tendencies to explore versus exploit become
pervasive as a firm grows in size, which results in organizational tension. A small firm size enables
flexibility and better responsiveness when attempting to fine-tune exploration and exploitation efforts, but
as the firm grows in size it may face stronger inertia (Hannan and Freeman 1984) and encounter
reorganization challenges in the presence of conflicting partnering procedures. Given its enhanced
flexibility, a small firm is sufficiently agile to transition between R&D alliances and production or
marketing alliances or to juggle new and existing partners, but as it grows in size it tends to be more
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bureaucratic and captive to its formal procedures (Child 1972), thus less flexible in modifying the
composition of alliances in its portfolio. As the scale of its operations increases, the firm tends to rely on
more formal procedures for carrying out partnering activities (Kale et al. 2002), and as a result, may find
it more difficult to maintain inconsistent organizational procedures for simultaneously managing diverse
types of alliances. The firm’s exploration and exploitation routines are likely to become rigid and thus
generate tension and conflict as it strives toward balance within domains. With growing size, the firm
may face stronger inertial pressures when employing different procedures or adjusting its routines for
collaborating with new versus familiar partners or when engaging in R&D versus marketing or production
alliances. Consequently, balancing exploration and exploitation within domains entails increasing friction.
Resource allocation tradeoffs and routine rigidity that intensify with firm size increase the costs of
maintaining a balance within the function and structure domains and impair the firm’s ability to
effectively balance exploration and exploitation within these domains.
Finally, in light of the inertial pressures that increase with firm size, a firm can benefit more from
specializing in either exploration or exploitation within a given domain. As the firm grows in size it is
inclined to invest in fixed assets and specialized personnel. Such large investments in specialized assets
and the increasing formalization of administrative structure and operating procedures inhibit further
adaptation (Hannan and Freeman 1977; Nickerson and Silverman 2003). As it gains in size, the firm’s
heuristics give way to institutionalized rules and regulations that reinforce organizational routines (Nelson
and Winter 1982). Consequently, increases in firm size limit the effectiveness of accommodating
conflicting partnering routines. Nevertheless, as its size increases the firm can mitigate the organizational
costs of balancing exploration and exploitation within domains by exploring in one domain while
exploiting in another. For example, it can better benefit from engaging in recurrent alliances with partners
that infuse new technologies, thus balancing function exploration with structure exploitation. Under such
conditions, the firm is expected to gain increasing returns on specialization in either exploration or
exploitation within each domain. Hence, a firm that attempts to balance activities across domains can
enjoy the complementary benefits of exploration and exploitation while minimizing its reliance on
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conflicting organizational procedures and mitigating the administrative costs that accumulate with firm
size. As its partnering routines become more rigid and prohibit effective balance of exploration and
exploitation within domains, balancing across domains becomes a more viable approach for a firm that
gains in size. Despite its increasing size, the firm can avoid the rising costs of reconciling conflicting
procedures within domains and benefit more from balance across domains of its alliance portfolio.
H3. The negative associations between firm performance and balance within (a) the function domain and
(b) the structure domain will intensify with increases in firm size.
H4. The positive association between balance across domains and firm performance will intensify with
increases in firm size.

Methods
Research setting and sample
We tested our hypotheses using pooled time-series analysis of U.S.-based firms in the software industry
(SICs 7371 through 7374). The dynamic and intensive formation of alliances in this industry enhances the
meaningfulness, reliability, and variance of our variables. Our interviews with industry experts suggest
that firms in this industry derive 30%-40% of their revenues from alliances, higher than the 26% revenue
contribution reported in an Andersen survey of Fortune 500 firms (Kalmbach and Roussel 1999). Thus,
alliances can meaningfully impact corporate performance in this industry. Moreover, the software
industry features a high proportion of publicly traded firms, ensuring the accessibility of financial
information and reducing potential size- and age-related biases. In addition, our sample is representative,
since the worldwide software industry is dominated by U.S.-based firms. For instance, a Standard &
Poor’s survey indicated that 23 of the top 25 software vendors are based in the United States, with U.S.based software firms accounting for half of the worldwide software market (Rudy 2000).2
This study’s timeframe spanned 1990 to 2002, with historical alliances tracked back to 1985 in order
to incorporate information on active alliances that were formed before 1990. This five-year window
follows standard assumptions regarding the duration of alliances (Stuart 2000), which in our sample was
2

Most of the focal firms were single business firms. Specifically, 84% of the firms had only a primary SIC code
10% had a single secondary SIC code, 5% had two secondary SIC codes, and less than 1% had three or four
secondary SIC codes. Thus, it is appropriate to define the industry based on the primary SIC code.
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shorter than five years (1.767 years on average). The initial sample included all 367 U.S.-based publicly
traded software firms that were active in the year 2001, had at least five years of records in the Compustat
database, and engaged in at least one alliance during the study’s timeframe.3 The effective sample size
ranged between 320 and 339 firms because of the lag structure of our data, missing values,4 and the
minimum number of observations per firm needed for computing the structure exploration variable.
Alliance records first were compiled from the SDC database and then extracted from alliance
announcements and status reports in press releases and partner listings posted on the Factiva database,
corporate websites, and Edgar SEC filings. Most announcements were cross-validated by at least two
independent sources. The original press announcement served as the primary source of information for
coding purposes. By relying on multiple sources and tracking follow-up announcements and status reports,
we minimized the recording of alliances that were announced but not realized. To further validate our
data, we reviewed some of our alliance listings with a select group of corporate executives in charge of
alliances. Following these procedures, alliance records were corroborated, corrected, added, or eliminated.
In total, we identified 20,779 alliances involving 8,801 unique partners from various industries.5 For each
alliance we coded the announcement date, pre-specified duration or termination date,6 number of partners,

3

We determined that the focus on U.S.-based firms that were active in 2001 and had at least five Compustat records
is not likely to introduce a selection bias based on the lack of differences between the sampled firms and the
remaining 297 publicly traded firms in the industry in terms of total assets (t = 1.43, p = .15), revenues (t = 0.53, p =
.60), number of employees (t = 0.27, p = .79), net income (t = 1.48, p = .14), cash (t = 1.51, p = .13), long-term debt
(t = 0.07, p = .95), stock price (t = 1.27, p = .20), and other relevant measures. These results suggest that our sample
is representative of public firms in the software industry.
4
Missing values occurred in several variables. For instance, information on R&D investments was missing for many
firms that were not required to report these figures by SEC regulations.
5
Only 24.7% of the identified alliances were reported in the SDC database. When comparing the proportions of
different types of alliance agreements in our final database to those reported in SDC, we found that our data offers
more extensive coverage of non-equity alliances (t = 25.85, p < 0.001) and alliances with foreign partners (t = 25.73,
p < 0.001). The proportions of marketing (t = 34.36, p < 0.001), original equipment manufacturing (OEM) (t =
22.89, p < 0.001), and R&D (t = 36.17, p < 0.001) agreements are also higher than in SDC, but the proportions of
supply (t = -4.16, p < 0.001), licensing (t = -26.87, p < 0.001), and royalties (t = -2.03, p < 0.05) agreements are
lower. These results rule out the possibility that the SDC database covers more substantial types of alliances.
6
Alliance termination dates were unavailable for many alliances, because firms rarely announce alliance termination
and occasionally maintain inactive alliances. If the date of alliance termination was unavailable from archival
sources, when possible it was calculated based on alliance extension announcements and reports of active alliance
status in a given year. For example, an alliance partner that was mentioned in a press release, in a 10K SEC form, or
in listings of partners posted on the firm’s corporate website was coded as active during the year in which such
report was found. Alliance termination dates were available for 23% of the alliances. Remaining alliances were
assumed to have a three-year duration based on the average specified duration of other alliances in the sample as
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and partners’ identities and countries of origin, as well as the strategic significance of the alliance,
whether it was a joint venture, and its classification to categories of agreements: R&D, production,
marketing and service, original equipment manufacturing / value-added resale, licensing, royalties, or
supply. An alliance could involve more than one type of agreement. Edgar SEC files served for
determining firms’ year of incorporation. Additional firm-specific data, such as total assets, revenues,
long-term debt, cash, R&D expenses, and net income, were extracted on an annual basis from Compustat.
Data on common shares outstanding and stock prices were gathered from the Compustat-CRSP database.
The firm-year served as the unit of analysis because the dependent variables were defined at the firm level.
The data for the 20,779 alliances were transformed to 2,587 firm-year observations corresponding to the
years 1990–2001 by pooling the data for all alliances in a firm’s portfolio in a given year. The effective
sample size in multivariate analysis ranged between 1,651 and 2,072 observations.
Variables
Dependent variables – firm performance. According to March, no single performance measure can
fully capture the benefits of exploration and exploitation: “returns from exploration are systematically less
certain, more remote in time….What is good in the long run is not always good in the short run” (1991:
73). Thus, to avoid possible bias in measuring the outcomes of exploration versus exploitation, we used
two performance measures: net profit as a short-term performance measure (Narayanan 1985) and firm
market value as a long-term performance measure (Kale, Dyer, and Singh 2002). Net profit is considered
an accounting measure of financial performance (Barnett, Greve, and Park 1994; Brush, Bromiley, and
Hendrickx 2000), whereas market value represents investors’ ex ante expectations about firms’ future
market performance (Lubatkin and Shrieves 1986). Market value was calculated by multiplying the firm’s
stock price by the number of common shares outstanding. Due to the high volatility of this measure, the
annual market value was calculated by averaging the 12 end-of-month daily values of the relevant
well as assessments of industry experts. The imputation of alliance termination dates is a common practice in
alliance research. For example, Stuart (2000) imputed alliance duration for all alliances using a linear depreciating
weighting for alliances with an earlier date of formation. In our study, the use of imputation was reduced by
searching alliance status reports and recording alliance termination dates when available. We controlled for the
implications of this imputation procedure by including a separate control for the average age of alliances.
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calendar year. We lagged all the explanatory variables and controls in the performance model by one year
relative to the dependent variables in order to facilitate causal interpretation of our findings.
Function exploration. We operationalized exploration-exploitation with a combined continuous
measure (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006) rather than with two separate indicators under the assumption that
exploration inhibits exploitation and vice versa, so that these two activities conflict (Abernathy 1978;
March 1991). This assumption is consistent with the negative correlation that we observed between
upstream and downstream alliance formation in the function domain (r = -.710, p < .001). We followed
Koza and Lewin’s (2000) distinction between exploration, exploitation, and hybrid alliances that integrate
downstream and upstream activities. Based on alliance announcements, a categorical indicator denoted
for each alliance whether it involved a knowledge-generating R&D agreement (coded “1”), another type
of agreement based on existing knowledge involving joint marketing and service, OEM/VAR, licensing,
production, or supply (coded “0”), or a combination of R&D and other agreements (coded “0.5”). Unlike
internal R&D that draws directly from the firm’s existing knowledge, R&D agreements in the software
industry entail moving outside of the firm’s technical knowledge base or at least integrating internal
knowledge with external knowledge of partners, thus representing exploration. Our function exploration
measure was calculated as the average value of the alliance agreement indicator across all alliances
formed by the focal firm in year t. Values range from 0 to 1, with high values indicating function
exploration and low values indicating function exploitation.
Structure exploration. For each alliance formed by the focal firm, an indicator received a value of “1”
if the firm had no joint prior alliances with its partner and “0” if such alliances existed. Then, for each
firm, structure exploration was calculated as the average value of this indicator across all alliances formed
by that firm in year t. In order not to classify a firm’s first alliance as structure exploration by default, for
lack of prior partnering history, we excluded 181 firm-year observations corresponding to years in which
firms formed their first and only alliance. Auxiliary analysis revealed, however, that our findings remain
virtually unchanged when these observations are retained. Values range from 0 to 1, with high values
indicating structure exploration and low values indicating structure exploitation.
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Firm size. We measured firm size as the value of total assets reported in Compustat. Firm size served
as a moderator of the relationship between exploration-exploitation and firm performance per hypotheses
3 and 4. This measure was highly correlated with alternative measures based on firm revenues (r = .840, p
< .001) and firm equity (r = .850, p < .001). We did not consider the number of employees given that the
industry is not labor intensive. Robustness tests using the alternative measures produced consistent results.
Control variables. We controlled for inter-industry variation by studying a single industry.7 In
addition, our controls included annually updated firm- and portfolio-level variables that were lagged by
one year relative to the dependent variables. Firm-level controls included firm size as measured by the
value of total assets, firm R&D intensity as measured by R&D investments divided by revenues, and firm
solvency as measured by the log-transformed ratio of cash to long-term debt. The firm’s available slack as
captured by the solvency measure and its internal investment in R&D may be indicative of the firm’s
tendency to engage in internal exploration efforts. The firm’s R&D intensity further controls for the
extent to which the firm invests in completely new technologies versus ones with which it has some prior
experience (Christensen 1998). We also included a measure of the firm’s number of acquisitions in a
given year since acquisitions may serve as an alternative mode for undertaking exploration outside the
firm’s boundaries (Schilling and Steensema 2002). Portfolio-level controls included the adjusted size of
the alliance portfolio (Ahuja 2000; Baum et al. 2000; Stuart et al. 1999), calculated as the logarithm of the
number of alliances divided by the firm’s total assets. The size of the alliance portfolio may be related to
the firm’s investments in searching for partners and governing its alliances. Multi-partner alliances were
decomposed to dyads for the purpose of calculating this control variable, which captures the firm’s
propensity to form alliances. Hence, we also controlled for the average number of partners involved in
each alliance. Following prior research (Contractor, Kundu, and Hsu 2003; Lavie and Miller, 2008), we
controlled for the proportion of foreign partners in the alliance portfolio. To control for changes in the
contributions of alliances as they progress, we measured the average age of alliances in the portfolio. We

7

An indicator of the firm’s four-digit SIC segment was not included as a control variable because of redundancy and
the occurrence of complete separation when the firm fixed effects were also included in the tested models.
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controlled for the complexity of alliances in the portfolio by including a measure of the proportion of
different agreement types per alliance. In addition, we included a measure of the percentage of equity
joint ventures in the alliance portfolio to control for the alliance governance structure. The strategic
significance of alliances was controlled by measuring the percentage of alliances that were identified as
strategic in alliance announcements. By measuring the duration, complexity, governance, and importance
of alliance relationships we control for relational embeddedness in the alliance portfolio (Uzzi 1996). This
set of controls helped us discern the performance effects of exploration and exploitation from the
implications of other properties of the firm’s alliance portfolio. All remaining inter-temporal trends and
interfirm heterogeneity were controlled for with firm fixed effects and year dummy indicators.8
Analysis
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. We used two-stage analysis for handling potential endogeneity in
firms’ decisions to engage in exploration and exploitation in their alliances (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006).
Firms’ tendencies to explore or exploit may derive from managers’ performance expectations based on
firm attributes and industry conditions. Failing to account for such endogeneity may bias the estimates of
exploration-exploitation effects and lead to erroneous conclusions (Hamilton and Nickerson 2003). The
specification and results of our first-stage models are reported in the Appendix. The predicted values of
function exploration and structure exploration from the first-stage models were entered as independent
variables in the second-stage models, where the firm’s market value and net profit served as dependent
variables. We implemented our second-stage models using cross-section time-series regressions with firm
fixed effects. Fixed effects models control for unobserved heterogeneity in the form of time-invariant
variables and in our case were found to be equivalent or superior to random effects models based on
Hausman (1978) tests. The inclusion of firm fixed effects suggests that the reported models explain
within-firm variation in performance over time rather than interfirm variation in performance. In addition,
8

In auxiliary analyses we considered additional control variables which were not reported eventually. For example,
we accounted for synergetic portfolio effects due to overlap in partners’ businesses (Vassolo, Anand, and Folta
2004). For each firm we calculated the number of partners with the same primary SIC code averaged across all
unique SIC codes of partners in the firm’s alliance portfolio in a given year. This control variable produced positive
yet insignificant effect on firm performance without affecting our reported results.
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the analysis of panel data raises concerns about serial correlation of errors within cross-sections, which
may deflate standard errors and inflate significance levels. Indeed, Baltagi-Wu (1999) locally best
invariant (LBI) test for autocorrelation detected first-order autocorrelation in market value (LBI = 1.366)
and net profit (LBI = 1.444). Autocorrelation was treated by incorporating first-order autoregressive errors
in the tested models, assuming correlation of errors across adjacent years.9 Thus, the tested models took
the form: yi,t+1 = α + βxi,t + ui + εi,t , where εi,t = ρεi,t-1 + μi,t and -1<ρ<1. In this equation, ui represents the
firm fixed effects and ρ is the autoregressive AR(1) parameter, which has a zero mean, homoskedastic,
and serially uncorrelated error term μi,t. We subjected these models to maximum likelihood estimation,
treating missing values with listwise deletion.
We relied on partial models for testing our hypotheses since tests for potential multicollinearity
indicated that the maximum VIF index in the full models exceeded the critical value of 10 (Kleinbaum,
Lawrence, Muller, and Nizam 1998). The high VIF values can be ascribed to the multiple instances of the
function exploration and structure exploration variables and the firm size moderator. Still, VIF values
dropped significantly and no symptoms of multicollinearity were present (Maddala 2001) in Models 4
and 9, which simultaneously incorporated the effects of function exploration and structure exploration.
We evaluated the fit of our models with log likelihood ratio tests comparing each model to the baseline
model (Model 1) after adjusting for the number of observations discarded because of missing values.
Insert Tables 1-4 about here

Results
Tables 2-3 and 4 correspondingly report the results of hierarchical second-stage models for balance within
domains and balance across domains. Since we run parallel analyses for each dependent variable, we use
the subscripts “MV” and “NP” to connote models for market value and net profit respectively. Models
1MV and 1NP are baseline models that include the control variables. Hypotheses 1a-b predicted negative
performance implications of balance within (a) the function domain (tested with Models 2MV and 2NP) and

9

Potential contemporaneous (cross-sectional) correlation across firms in the panel data was also tested and ruled out
since the additional covariance parameter turned out to be insignificant.
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(b) the structure domain (tested with Models 3MV and 3NP). A negative linear term of the exploration
variable and a positive quadratic term in these models would suggest a U-shaped curve in support of this
set of hypotheses. Even though the coefficients had the expected signs, Models 2MV and 2NP indicate no
significant effects of balance within the function domain on either market value or net profit, with the
exception of a significant positive effect of the quadratic term of function exploration on firm market
value (β = 18.37, p < .05). This finding does not support the premise that balance within the function
domain has favorable performance implications. Instead, excessive exploration in that domain contributes
to superior market value.10 Model 3MV reveals a negative effect of structure exploration (β = -152.1, p
< .001) and a positive effect of its quadratic term on market value (β = 85.38, p < .001). Similarly, Model
3NP reports a negative effect of structure exploration (β = -5.348, p < .01) and a positive effect of its
quadratic term on net profit (β = 3.154, p < .01). These U-shaped patterns of structure exploration are
consistent with hypothesis 1b. These results remain significant when testing the effects of function
exploration and structure exploration simultaneously in Models 4MV and 4NP.
Hypotheses 3a-b predicted that the negative performance implications of balance within (a) the
function domain (tested with Models 5MV and 5NP) and (b) the structure domain (tested with Models 6MV
and 6NP) will intensify with increases in firm size. These hypotheses are supported if the performance
function becomes more concave (U-shaped as opposed to inverted U-shaped) when the exploration
variables are moderated by firm size. In support of hypothesis 3a, Model 5MV (Table 2) reveals a positive
effect of function exploration on market value (β = 21.69, p < .001) and a negative effect of its quadratic
term (β = -24.09, p < .001). In turn, the interaction effect of firm size and function exploration on market
value is negative (β = -110.5, p < .001), while the interaction of firm size and the quadratic term of
function exploration is positive (β = 136.17, p < .001). Similarly, Model 5NP (Table 3) indicates a positive
linear effect (β = 1.552, p < .001) and a negative quadratic effect (β = -1.464, p < .001) of function

10

In auxiliary analysis we dropped the quadratic term from Model 2MV. The difference in fit statistics between the
reported model and the linear model was significant (∆ -2LL = 5.1, p < 0.05). We thus conclude that even though
the linear term in Model 2MV is insignificant, the curvilinear function better fits the data than a linear function, in
accordance with Hypothesis 1MV.
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exploration on net profit. The interaction of firm size with the linear term of function exploration is
negative (β = -6.433, p < .001), while its interaction with the quadratic term of function exploration is
positive (β = 6.624, p < .001). These findings demonstrate how the effects of function exploration on
market value and net profit shift from inverted U-shaped to U-shaped with increases in firm size.
Similarly, Model 6MV (Table 2) reveals a positive linear effect (β = 165.5, p < .001) and a negative
quadratic effect (β = -95.74, p < .001) of structure exploration on market value. The interaction of firm
size with the linear term of structure exploration is negative (β = -311.6, p < .001), while its interaction
with the quadratic term is positive (β = 170.2, p < 0.01). In Model 7NP (Table 3) the linear effect of
structure exploration on net profit is positive (β = 3.873, p < .05), whereas the effect of its quadratic term
is negative (β = -2.215, p < .1). The interaction effect of firm size with the linear term of structure
exploration is negative (β = -13.71, p < .001), whereas its interaction with the quadratic term is positive (β
= 7.944, p < .001). Hence, these findings reveal how the effects of structure exploration on market value
and net profit shift from inverted U-shaped to U-shaped with increases in firm size in accordance with
hypothesis 3b. The interaction effects of firm size with the function and structure exploration functions
remain significant when introduced simultaneously in Models 7MV and 7NP. Figure 1 depicts the predicted
performance functions for balance within domains. This figure reaffirms the U-shaped effects of balance
within the function and structure domains, revealing modest superiority of function exploration and a
major advantage of structure exploitation, as firms grow in size.
Table 4 reports the results of models used for testing hypotheses 2 and 4 on the performance
implications of balance across domains. In particular, Models 9MV and 9NP serve to test hypothesis 2 by
introducing a linear interaction of function exploration and structure exploration. Positive main effects
and negative interaction effects would suggest that simultaneous increases in exploration in both domains
are not beneficial, as predicted by this hypothesis. Accordingly, when exploration is extensive in one
domain and limited in the other, firm performance should improve. Indeed, these models reveal positive
effects of function exploration on market value (β = 84.47, p < .001) and net profit (β = 2.86, p < .01) as
well as positive effects of structure exploration on market value (β = 30.83, p < .05) and net profit (β =
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1.276, p < .1). Yet, the interaction effects of function exploration and structure exploration are negative
for both market value (β = -84.3, p < .001) and net profit (β = -2.928, p < .05). In support of hypothesis 2,
these findings suggest that when a firm increases exploration in either the function or the structure domain,
its performance improves, but when exploration increases in both domains it faces decline in performance.
Finally, Models 10MV and 10NP serve to test hypothesis 4 which suggested intensifying positive
effects of balance across domains as firms gain in size. These models supplement Models 9MV and 9NP by
introducing interaction terms for its covariates with firm size. Hypothesis 4 gains support to the extent
that the moderated effects reinforce those tested by Models 9MV and 9NP, i.e. positive interactions of firm
size with function exploration and structure exploration as well as a negative three-way interaction of firm
size with function exploration and structure exploration. Indeed, Model 10MV provides such support with
positive interaction effects of firm size with function exploration (β = 170.07, p < .001) and structure
exploration (β = 78.66, p < .001) and a negative three-way interaction effect on market value (β = -188.7,
p < .001). Similarly, Model 10NP offers support to hypothesis 4 with positive interaction effects of firm
size with function exploration (β = 6.314, p < .001) and structure exploration (β = 3.074, p < .001) and a
negative three-way interaction effect on net profit (β = -8.277, p < .001).11 Thus, the negative effect of the
interaction between function exploration and structure exploration on net profit intensifies with firm size.
Figure 2 shows favorable performance implications of balance across domains for a mean-sized firm,
especially for a configuration of function exploration and structure exploitation. The benefits of balance
across domains intensify with increases in firm size, but at very small firm sizes, balance across domains
produces unfavorable performance implications. Our results are summarized in Table 5.
Insert Table 5 about here

Robustness Tests

11

The multiple inclusions of the exploration variables and the moderator in these models resulted in high VIFs
(reaching 34.78 in Model 10MV and 34.56 in Model 10NP). However, with the exception of insignificant
unmoderated terms of function and structure exploration in Model 10NP, no symptoms of multicollinearity were
observed and the exclusion of the interaction terms of firm size with the exploration variables, while significantly
reducing VIF levels, retained the negative effects of the three-way interactions. Furthermore, our models produced
consistent results after dropping insignificant controls such as firm R&D intensity, firm solvency, alliance age,
agreements per alliance, and percentage of foreign partners, thus attenuating concerns of multicollinearity.
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To test the robustness of our findings we first considered alternative operationalizations of firm
performance. This auxiliary analysis revealed that hypothesis 1 gained support with respect to function
exploration when firm performance was measured as growth in market value and with respect to structure
exploration when firm performance was measured as growth in net profit. Hypothesis 2 gained support
when growth in net profit or exponential growth in market value served as an alternative performance
measure. Additionally, hypotheses 3 and 4 gained support when growth in market value was used as the
dependent variable. Nevertheless, our reported measures of firm performance (market value and net
profit) were more consistent. Additionally, our results were robust to the inclusion of net profit as a
control variable when testing market value models and vice versa. Moreover, we tested the robustness of
incorporating one-year lag between exploration activities and our performance measures by considering
models in which we introduced two- and three-year lags. Our results revealed that models with one-year
lag produced better fit statistics, thus reaffirming our model specification. Furthermore, we considered the
possibility that different types of alliances produce outcomes at different stages of their lifecycles by
incorporating an interaction of alliance age with function exploration in our models. This term turned out
insignificant and did not influence the significance of our predicted effects.
Next, we considered a firm’s revenues as an alternative measure of the size moderator, finding that
our results remained significant with the exception of the unmoderated effects of function exploration and
structure exploration on net profit in Models 5NP-7NP, the main effect of structure exploration on net profit
in Model 9MV, and the main effects and interaction of function exploration and structure exploration on
net profit in Models 9NP and 10NP. We then considered the possibility that our moderator captures the
effect of the size of the firm’s alliance portfolio. When we replaced the firm size moderator with a
measure of the number of partners in the firm’s alliance portfolio, hypotheses 3 and 4 gained support,
which is understandable given the high correlation between the number of partners and the firm’s asset
value (r = .740, p < .001) and revenues (r = .520, p < .001). To isolate our moderation effect we tested
revised models in which both firm size and the size of the alliance portfolio were introduced as
moderators. In these models the moderation effects of firm size retained their levels of significance,
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whereas the moderation effects of the size of the alliance portfolio became inconsistent or insignificant
with the exception of the effect on the association between balance in the structure domain and the firm’s
market value. Similarly, when firm age was used as a moderator instead of firm size, hypotheses 3 and 4
gained partial support with insignificant interaction effect of firm age and function exploration on market
value. When the firm age moderator was incorporated together with the firm size moderator, the
interactions involving firm size remained significant whereas the interactions with firm age lost
significance or became inconsistent due to suspected multicollinearity. These auxiliary analyses reaffirm
our choice of firm size as a moderator.12
In addition, we considered second-order exploitation (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006), whereby prior
exploration experience in a particular domain may help some firms enhance the effectiveness of
subsequent exploration efforts in that domain. We tested the effects of exploration in the function and
structure domains moderated by prior exploration experience in the corresponding domain. The
moderation effects of prior experience in the function domain were insignificant but the interaction of
structure exploration and prior exploration experience had a positive effect on market value (the main
effect was negative). A similar pattern was observed with net profit as the dependent variable, although
the moderation effect was only marginally significant. Thus, gaining experience in forming alliances with
new partners enables the firm to enhance the contribution of such alliances to its performance.
Accordingly, the benefits of exploration and exploitation may be idiosyncratic and depend on the firm’s
particular exploration experience in certain domains.

Discussion
Following March (1991), scholars have advocated the balance between exploration and exploitation yet
acknowledged the challenges that firms may face when pursuing such balance (Gupta et al. 2006).
Organizational and temporal separation have been offered as a means for simultaneously exploring and

12

The partially significant moderation effects of firm age and the size of the alliance portfolio are consistent with
our theory, since resource allocation constraints and conflicting organizational routines can result not only from the
impediments associated with a large organization but also from the rigidities ascribed to maturation and increases in
the number of alliances in the portfolio. Yet, resource allocation constraints may be less prevalent in the latter cases.
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exploiting (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997; Tushman et al. 1997), yet limited systematic evidence exists
concerning the performance implications of balance between these two organizational activities. We
advance an emerging stream of research on exploration and exploitation in alliances (Beckman et al.
2004; Koza and Lewin 1998; Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006; Lin et al. 2007; Park et al. 2002; Rothaermel
2001; Rothaermel and Deeds 2004) by examining the performance implications of balance within and
across domains of alliance formation. Our findings reveal that the traditional form of balance within the
function and structure domains is disadvantageous whereas balance across the function and structure
domains can contribute to firm performance. We also identify heterogeneity in firms’ abilities to benefit
from balance within and across domains. Hence, we divert attention from the basic question of whether a
balance between exploration and exploitation is desirable to focus on the means by which firms can best
leverage different forms of balance in their alliance formation decisions.
Our framework complements the organizational and temporal separation approaches by underscoring
the merits of balancing exploration and exploitation across domains as opposed to balance within domains.
In fact, the traditional approach to the ambidexterity problem (Tushman and O’Reilly 1996) can be
considered a special case of our framework whereby the firm balances exploration and exploitation within
a single domain by allocating technological activities to separate organizational units. According to
Benner and Tushman, “ambidextrous organizations are composed of multiple tightly coupled subunits
that are themselves loosely coupled with each other. Within subunits the tasks, culture, individuals, and
organizational arrangements are consistent, but across subunits tasks and cultures are inconsistent and
loosely coupled” (2003: 247). The main difference between such organizational separation and our
approach is that in the case of alliances, separation takes place across domains of the alliance portfolio
rather than across organizational units. Indeed, a firm’s use of alliances for exploration or exploitation
may entail separation between internal organizational units that pursue one type of activity from alliances
that serve to carry out the other. Nevertheless, since in most cases alliances serve to both explore and
exploit, domain separation is not equivalent to organizational separation. Even when a firm establishes a
dedicated alliance function, such a corporate unit is responsible for all types of alliances regardless of the
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function that they serve or the incumbency status of partners in the alliance portfolio.
Resolving the exploration-exploitation dilemma in alliance portfolios
Traditionally, research on exploration and exploitation has limited its focus to balance within a single
domain, such as in the case of technology versus marketing and production alliances in the function
domain (Rothaermel and Deeds 2004) or new versus prior partners in the structure domain (Lin et al.
2007). Our study demonstrates that this form of balance within domains contributes to financial
performance neither in the short term nor in the long term. In particular, a firm does not benefit from
simultaneously leveraging its alliances to generate new knowledge and to utilize existing knowledge.
Furthermore, in line with prior research (Lin et al. 2007), a firm that simultaneously invests in seeking
new partners and renewing existing alliance relationships can expect decline in its market value and net
profit. We ascribe this performance decline to resource allocation tradeoffs and inconsistent partnering
routines that offset the benefits of simultaneously extending the reach and receptivity to network
resources. The inability to develop and employ consistent partnering routines (Nelson and Winter 1982)
and the misapplication of such routines (Jensen and Szulanski 2004; Lavie and Miller, 2008) result in
negative learning effects that impede processes of forming, managing, and assessing alliances.
Furthermore, our findings reveal that the impediments associated with balance within domains
exacerbate with firm size. In contrast to preliminary findings of prior research (Lin et al. 2007), we show
that as a firm accumulates assets, balance within a domain incurs losses and decline in market value since
the firm may lose flexibility and hence its ability to reconcile conflicting exploration and exploitation
routines within a given domain. Besides routine rigidity, the firm may become less dependent on its
alliances as it accumulates internal assets, which exacerbates resource allocation tradeoffs in the alliance
portfolio and undermines performance. Firms that nurture extensive alliance portfolios often develop
consistent partnering routines and attempt to coordinate their engagements in multiple alliances. Despite
the immediate merits of such practices (Hoffmann 2007; Kale et al. 2002; Lavie 2007; Zollo et al. 2002),
we caution that as a firm grows and perhaps extends its alliance portfolio, the difficulty of balancing
exploration and exploitation within the function or structure domains can impair financial performance.
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Whereas balancing exploration and exploitation within domains does not lead to desirable
performance, our findings underscore the merits of balance across domains. A firm can increase its profits
and market value by exploring in one domain while exploiting in another, yet faces declining performance
when attempting to simultaneously explore in both domains. This form of balance enhances both
innovativeness and productivity without needing to reconcile conflicting partnering routines or coping
with resource allocation tradeoffs within each domain. The firm can effectively discover new knowledge
while leveraging its relational embeddedness with familiar partners or rather extend its network reach and
social capital while leveraging its existing knowledge base. Attempts to simultaneously explore by
initiating R&D alliances while seeking new partners introduce undesirable managerial challenges,
whereas attempts to simultaneously reinforce existing relationships while engaging in marketing and
production alliances degenerate the alliance portfolio by restricting heterogeneity and access to
technological opportunities. Consequently, a firm that balances exploration and exploitation across
domains can more effectively reap the benefits of balance. Nevertheless, such a firm still faces the
challenge of deciding whether to concentrate on exploration or exploitation in a given domain. Trial and
error is not advisable since this approach may draw the firm toward balance within domains. A firm may
need to identify its relative strengths within each domain, consider performance feedback, and examine
the nature of partnering opportunities when deciding whether to explore or exploit in a given domain.
Furthermore, balancing exploration and exploitation across domains becomes a more attractive form
of balance as a firm gains in size. A small firm cannot effectively leverage balance across domains,
possibly due to the inability of its internal organization to complement alliance operations in a given
domain. Despite its dependence on alliances, its challenge of attracting prominent partners may limit the
prospects of specialization and exclusive reliance on alliances for either exploration or exploitation. Yet,
as the firm grows, it faces more dominant resource allocation constraints in its alliance portfolio and its
partnering routines are likely to become more rigid. Hence, a growing firm can gain more by specializing
in either exploration or exploitation within a given domain. For such firm, balance across domains
becomes a more efficient solution although it can also rely on organizational separation to support
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specialization. Hence, by discretionally manipulating exploration and exploitation tendencies within and
across domains, firms can maximize the benefits of their alliance portfolios both in the short term and in
the long term.
Directions for future research
This study contributes to understanding the conditions and means by which firms can benefit from
balancing exploration and exploitation in their alliance portfolios, yet leaves room for future research.
First, we have studied the function and structure domains following established research on alliances (e.g.,
Beckman, et al. 2004; Grant and Baden-Fuller 2004; Koza and Lewin 1998; Lin et al. 2007; Park et al.
2002; Rothaermel 2001). Future research may consider additional domains corresponding to the attributes
of alliance partners, such as their industry focus (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006). It may refine some domains,
for instance, by studying the degree of technological innovation (Christensen 1998) promoted by alliances
in the function domain instead of dichotomously categorizing alliances based on their value chain
functions. It may be also worthwhile to examine exploration and exploitation in this domain based on the
productive outcomes of upstream and downstream alliances. Additionally, future research may advance
the ambidexterity literature by uncovering relevant domains of exploration and exploitation within a
firm’s organization, thus extending our approach to the intra-organizational context. We believe, however,
that since our logic is not dependent on the nature of domain, consideration of additional domains is
likely to produce consistent findings.
Second, our study complements prior research that has studied the balance between exploration and
exploitation within organizational boundaries (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997; He and Wong 2004; Jansen,
Van Den Bosch, and Volberda 2006; Sidhu et al. 2007; Tushman and O’Reilly 1996) by considering
balance in alliances that transcend such boundaries. Besides balancing exploration and exploitation across
domains in the firm’s alliance portfolio, a firm can balance these activities across organizational
boundaries, i.e., exploit internally while exploring through alliances or vice versa. It can also engage in
acquisitions to facilitate its exploration or exploitation efforts. Such approaches can substitute the need for
balance within the function or structure domains of the alliance portfolio. In the current study we sought
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to control for these alternative modes, but future research may directly investigate the performance
implications of balance within and across organizational boundaries by simultaneously studying
exploration via internal units, alliances, and acquisitions. Such research may identify additional tradeoffs
and optimal policies for exploring and exploiting through various organizational modes.
Third, once scholars juxtapose exploration and exploitation tendencies within and across
organizational boundaries they can effectively assess the advantages of domain separation compared to
organizational separation and temporal separation. Domain separation may be superior yet accompanied
by organizational separation or temporal separation which play a role in shaping organizational tradeoffs
and nurturing exploration and exploitation routines. Nevertheless, studying organizational separation may
require more intimate understanding of firms’ organizational structures and the roles of their various units.
Fourth, future research may examine additional contingencies besides firm size that may shape the
benefits of balancing exploration and exploitation within and across domains. For instance, recent
research has underscored the role of environmental uncertainty, dynamism, and competitiveness (Jansen
et al. 2006; Lin et al. 2007; Park et al. 2002), shedding some light on the interplay between internal and
external drivers of exploration and exploitation effects. These drivers may shape the effects of balance
within and across domains of the alliance portfolio. In addition, we underscore the role of routine rigidity
and other organizational impediments that may steer a firm away from balance within domains. Perhaps
future research can identify organizational forces that relieve firms from resource allocation tradeoffs and
mitigate the costs of balance within domains. Interestingly, increases in firm size which make balance
within domains less favorable in the alliance portfolio relax resource allocation constraints in the internal
organization, and may thus enhance the benefits of balance within intra-organizational domains.
Finally, future research may test our framework in other industries. We have focused on the software
industry, since its intensity of alliance formation enables us to effectively track patterns of exploration and
exploitation. Resource allocation tradeoffs and inconsistent organizational routines may be more or less
critical for firm performance in other industries. Furthermore, the optimal level of balance may vary
across industries. For instance, in highly dynamic industries balance may be achieved at higher levels of
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exploration, whereas stable industries may favor higher levels of exploitation. Nevertheless, while firms
in other industries may demonstrate different patterns within certain domains, we still expect that balance
across domains will be more advantageous than balance within domains of the alliance portfolio.
This study makes important strides toward resolving the dilemma posed by March (1991). It furnishes
evidence on the implications of balancing exploration and exploitation, revealing how they depend on the
means by which firms pursue this balance and on their organizational characteristics. Whereas balance
within alliance domains can be detrimental to firm performance, balancing exploration and exploitation
across such domains serves as a beneficial approach. The ambidexterity literature, while acknowledging
the challenge of reconciling conflicting organizational routines that support exploration versus
exploitation, has called for organizational separation which in and of itself is difficult to develop and
maintain. Our approach does not require the nurturing of inconsistent managerial practices at the
corporate level, the hiring of nimble managers, the use of job rotation and other managerial techniques
that impose their own organizational challenges. Rather, it entails recognizing the multidimensionality of
the problem by looking at multiple organizational domains, thus enhancing firm performance without
facing the adverse consequences of introducing organizational buffers or constantly modifying
organizational structures, which is especially problematic for a firm that manages large-scale operations.

Appendix – First Stage Model
In this study we used a two-stage analysis to account for endogeneity in firms’ tendencies to engage in
exploration and exploitation. Specifically, firms’ decisions to engage in exploration versus exploitation
may change over time (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006) or throughout product life cycles (Rothaermel and
Deeds 2004). In addition, as firms mature they may become more dependent on their established routines
and skills (Hannan and Freeman 1984) and thus less likely to change their strategic orientations (Kelly
and Amburgey 1991) and engage in exploration. Prior research also suggests that tendencies to explore or
exploit vary with firm size (Beckman et al. 2004; Rothaermel and Deeds 2004). Moreover, firms’ external
exploration activities through alliances may complement or substitute internal exploration activities. The
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availability of financial funds may further facilitate slack-induced search (Bourgeois 1981; Levinthal and
March 1981; March 1976; Nohria and Gulati 1996). In turn, prior partnering experience has been
associated with organizational inertia (Li and Rowley 2002) and may account for path dependence in
alliance formation decisions in the structure domain (Chung et al. 2000; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999).
Finally, prior experience in exploring in the function or structure domains may influence future
exploration tendencies in the corresponding domain (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006).
Therefore, in the first-stage models we regressed function exploration and structure exploration at
time t on a firm’s age, size, R&D intensity, financial solvency, partnering experience, and exploration
experience in the corresponding domain at time t-1. Prior partnering experience was computed as a count
of all prior alliances formed by the focal firm with any partner between 1985 and the preceding year.
Exploration experience was calculated with the same formulas used for constructing our exploration
measures, but instead of incorporating the alliances formed in year t we counted alliances between 1985
and the preceding year (t-1). All the independent variables in the first-stage model were lagged by one
year relative to the dependent variables with the exception of firm age, which was time-invariant given
the inclusion of year fixed effects. All remaining interfirm heterogeneity in exploration-exploitation was
controlled for by firm fixed effects. The combination of year and firm fixed effects in addition to the prior
history of exploration experience effectively accounts for unobserved heterogeneity (Blundell et al. 1995).
The first-stage Tobit model (Tobin 1958) reported in Table 6 was estimated using maximum likelihood
estimation while accounting for the panel structure of the data and correcting for autocorrelation using
first-order AR(1) process. The values of the dependent variables were forced to range between 0 and 1.
Insert Table 6 about here
Table 6 reports the results of the first-stage model, predicting function exploration and structure
exploration in alliances. The results reveal that prior partnering experience facilitates exploitation in the
structure domain (β = -0.001, p < .05), consistent with prior research that shows how extensive partnering
experience encourages firms to seek prior partners for their new alliances (Beckman et al. 2004; Lavie
and Rosenkopf 2006). Additionally, exploration in both the function and structure domains was
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negatively related to prior experience in the corresponding domain (β = -0.259; β = -0.601, p < .001).
Most of the variance in function exploration and structure exploration can be ascribed to prior experience
as well as to the firm and year fixed effects that capture unobserved heterogeneity in firm-specific
characteristics and temporal trends, partially at the expense of other predictors. In auxiliary analysis we
dropped the fixed effects and the exploration experience variables and found that other predictors, such as
the firm’s size, solvency and partnering experience significantly account for variance in exploration
tendencies. Nevertheless, because our main concern was with controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
rather than with uncovering the antecedents of exploration and exploitation, we retained the experience
variables and fixed effects in the first-stage models. In accordance with Baum, Schaffer and Stillman
(2003) we conducted Sargan difference tests for endogeneity (a robust version of the Hausman test)
which confirmed that function exploration is endogenous in the market value model (χ2 =34.494, p <
0.0001) and that structure exploration is endogenous in the market value (χ2 =57.115, p < 0.0001) and net
profit models (χ2 =30.573, p < 0.0001). Furthermore, we ran several tests to ensure that our instrumental
variables in the first stage are relevant and significant. To offer conservative assessments we dropped the
firm fixed effects when conducting these tests. Tests of joint significance of our endogenous regressors
revealed that our instrumental variables are significant per the Anderson-Rubin Wald test and based on
the Stock-Wright LMS statistic. Then, we used the weak identification test (Stock, Wright and Yogo
2002) that produced Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics which were larger than the Stock-Yogo critical value.
These latter statistics are conservative since they account for size distortions to weak instruments and
correct for the number of instruments (Bascle, 2008). Overall, these results indicate the strength of our
instrumental variables and support our reliance on two-stage models.13

13

In auxiliary analysis we ran single-stage models in which the original exploration variables were used with no
correction for endogeneity. Consistent results were obtained with respect to the moderating effects of firm size on
the relationships between balance within the function domain and the firm’s market value and net profit as well as
between balance within the structure domain and the firm’s market value, in partial support of Hypothesis 3.
Additionally, the interactions of firm size with function exploration and structure exploration produced some
significant effects in partial support of Hypothesis 4.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations for Sampled Firms during 1990-2001
Variable
1. Function Exploration t
2. Structure Exploration t
3. Firm Size t-1
4. Firm Age 2001
5. Firm R&D Intensity t-1
6. Firm Solvency t-1
7. Partnering Experience t-1
8. Function Explor. Experience t-1
9. Structure Explor. Experience t-1
10. Firm Market Value t+1
11. Firm Net Profit t+1
12. Firm Size t
13. Firm R&D Intensity t
14. Firm Solvency t
15. Size of Alliance Portfolio t
16. Alliance Age t
17. Partners per Alliance t
18. Agreements per Alliance t
19. % Foreign Partners t
20. % Joint Ventures t
21. % Strategic Alliances t
22. Acquisitions t

Variable
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Firm Solvency t
Size of Alliance Portfolio t
Alliance Age t
Partners per Alliance t
Agreements per Alliance t
% Foreign Partners t
% Joint Ventures t
% Strategic Alliances t
Acquisitions t

N
2587
2406
2216
2587
1965
2204
2587
2244
2070
2306
2412
2355
2121
2341
2564
2587
2587
2587
2587
2587
2587
2587

13.

Mean S.D.
0.461
0.892
0.381
18.018
0.347
4.592
22.238
0.469
0.925
2.125
0.011
0.410
0.359
4.762
-0.959
1.767
2.158
0.057
0.176
0.033
0.301
0.817

1.

0.355
0.188
1.477
8.256
1.099
4.508
55.373
0.278
0.095
17.646
0.541
1.523
1.103
4.577
3.038
0.529
0.603
0.056
0.196
0.105
0.270
2.018

14.

.002
.168*** .014
-.041†
.080***
-.022
-.357†
†
.040
.022
.039
.029
-.014
-.138***
-.010
-.028
-.055*
.00

-.099***
.024
-.008
-.001
.071***
.072***
.279***
-.144***
.036†
.014***
.024
.038†
.077***
.003
.038†
.075***
.269***
-.053**
-.045*
.155***
.018

15.
-.044*
.008
-

Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

-.092***
-.006
.013
-.110***
-.218***
-.118***
.251***
-.105***
-.074***
-.096***
.042*
-.097***
.042*
-.169***
-.097***
-.056**
-.046*
.012
-.051*
-.093***

.067**
-.045*
-.077***
.533***
.013
-.181***
.454***
.203***
.890***
-.346***
-.097***
-.346***
.075***
.131***
-.008
-.010
.128***
.117***
.471***

-.141***
-.049*
.023
-.013
-.001
.071***
.118***
.084***
-.126***
-.051*
-.188***
.099***
.069***
.066***
-.021
.121***
.113***
.106***

.0044
-.028
.051*
-.020
-.018
-.016
-.049*
.564***
.003
.179***
-.018
-.025
.018
.035
-.018
-.018
-.062**

.192***
.070**
-.170***
.106***
.053*
-.076***
.044*
.730***
.040†
.109***
-.024
.025
.033
-.145***
-.044*
022

.088***
-.418***
.721***
.503***
.480***
-.033
.188***
-.158***
.220***
.129***
-.037†
.045*
.021
.061**
.470***

-.220***
.054*
.027
.011
.045*
.077***
-.005
-.002
.078***
.261***
.008
-.009
.130***
.016

16.

17.

.016
-.010
.086***
-.030
-.036†
.070***

.044*
.014
.163**
*
.166**
*
.076**
*

18.

19.

.075***
.047*
.118**
*
***
.310
-.001
.008
.004

20.

21.

-.016
.071***

.164***

9.

-.193***
-.125***
-.166***
-.001
-.160***
.113***
-.167***
-.110***
-.048*
-.088***
.025
-.068**
-.156***

10.

11.

12.

.671***
.561***
-.019
.100***
-.138***
.018
.097***
-.007
.011
.045*
.088***
.531***

-.011
-.015
-.061**
-.042*
.028
.070***
.005
.007***
.035†
.066**
.368***

-.049*
-.079***
-.390***
.067**
.131***
-.010
-.018
.117***
.126***
.495***
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TABLE 2
Fixed Effects Panel AR(1) Second-Stage Models for Firm Market Value – Balance Within Domains
Dependent Variable: Market Value t+1 Model Model Model Model
Model
Model
Model
1MV
2MV
3MV
4MV
5MV
6MV
7MV
***
Intercept
2.216 -1.398
70.45*** 66.35*** -2.454
-71.03
-52.86***
(4.285) (5.588) (15.52) (16.19) (3.394) (10.14)
(9.819)
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Firm Size t
3.115*** 3.109*** 3.141*** 3.09*** 19.99*** 143.1*** 106.5***
(0.164) (0.181) (0.185) (0.19)
(0.776) (3.820)
(4.128)
Firm R&D Intensity t
-0.035 -0.089 -0.023 -0.108
0.007
-0.050
-0.007
(0.142) (0.208) (0.213) (0.215) (0.172) (0.145)
(0.142)
Firm Solvency t
-0.015 -0.003 -0.010 -0.002 -0.030
-0.034
-0.040
(0.042) (0.050) (0.053) (0.053) (0.035) (0.034)
(0.031)
***
***
***
***
***
*
Size of Alliance Portfolio t
0.699
0.865
1.064
1.052
0.515
0.316
0.276*
(0.180) (0.227) (0.244) (0.243) (0.153) (0.152)
(0.139)
Alliance Age t
-0.162
0.013
0.200
0.160 -0.133
0.015
-0.062
(0.340) (0.405) (0.431) (0.430) (0.235) (0.276)
(0.258)
†
*
*
*
Partners per Alliance t
-0.512 -0.813 -0.910 -0.884 -0.134
0.026
0.144
(0.295) (0.352) (0.368) (0.368) (0.235) (0.230)
(0.210)
Agreements per Alliance t
-3.259 -3.378 -6.526 -4.721 -3.183
0.156
-1.930
(3.664) (4.953) (5.586) (5.617) (3.271) (3.429)
(3.134)
% Foreign Partners t
-0.701 -1.232 -1.171 -1.269 -0.147
-0.022
0.147
(0.955) (1.262) (1.380) (1.376) (0.837) (0.851)
(0.774)
% Joint Ventures t
-3.029 -5.470† -5.816† -5.719† -2.200
-3.832*
-3.553*
(1.874) (2.830) (3.049) (3.044) (1.838) (1.854)
(1.676)
*
*
*
†
% Strategic Alliances t
0.924
1.538
2.570
2.399
1.619
1.403
1.451*
(0.785) (1.056) (1.196) (1.193) (0.690) (0.729)
(0.657)
Acquisitions
0.699*** 0.800*** 0.854*** 0.860*** 0.489*** 0.135†
0.087
(0.079)
(0.104) (0.118) (0.123) (0.123) (0.090) (0.082)
-12.10
-16.56
21.69***
4.624
Function Exploration t
(8.740)
(11.29) (6.364)
(6.603)
Function Exploration t2
18.37*
-10.70†
25.52* -24.09***
(8.122)
(5.992)
(10.207) (5.804)
165.5*** 133.3***
Structure Exploration t
-152.1*** -158.2***
(23.45)
(22.03)
(35.53) (35.51)
-95.74*** -79.22***
Structure Exploration t2
85.38*** 89.87***
(21.70) (21.69)
(14.27)
(13.40)
***
-60.47***
Firm Size t x Function Exploration t
-110.5
(4.127)
(3.553)
71.76***
Firm Size t x Function Exploration t2
136.17***
(4.498)
(3.735)
***
Firm Size t x Structure Exploration t
-311.6*** -206.4
(11.24)
(9.515)
2
***
111.84***
Firm Size t x Structure Exploration t
170.2
(6.874)
(5.886)
AR(1) Parameter
0.437
0.407
0.392
0.388 0.018
0.216
0.087
N Firm-Years
2041
1768
1674
1674
1768
1674
1674
N Firms
339
327
320
320
327
320
320
VIF
1.699
2.975
5.862
7.406 7.204
79.31
137.4
-2Log Likelihood
12427.3 10979.8 10458.6 10448.8 9782.0
8908.9
8673.7
∆ -2LL
7.4*
21.7*** 31.5*** 1205.2*** 1571.4*** 1806.6***
Exploration variables predicted from first-stage model. Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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TABLE 3
Fixed Effects Panel AR(1) Second-Stage Models for Firm Net Profit – Balance Within Domains
Dependent Variable: Net Profit t+1
Model Model Model Model Model Model Model
1NP
2NP
3NP
4NP
5NP
6NP
7NP
Intercept
0.176
0.064
2.508** 2.415** -0.098 -1.485 -0.703
(0.292) (0.360) (0.886) (0.926) (0.283) (0.830) (0.798)
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Firm Size t
-0.329*** -0.312*** -0.308*** -0.309*** 1.128*** 5.540*** 3.622***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.064) (0.336) (0.350)
Firm R&D Intensity t
-0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
0.0001 -0.000 -0.0001
(0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Firm Solvency t
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Size of Alliance Portfolio t
0.038*** 0.052*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.055*** 0.046*** 0.047***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Alliance Age t
-0.014
0.0002 0.009
0.008
0.009
0.013
0.013
(0.018) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Partners per Alliance t
-0.027† -0.054** -0.062** -0.061** -0.055** -0.050** -0.053**
(0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Agreements per Alliance t
-0.332 -0.336 -0.594† -0.547† -0.305 -0.408 -0.297
(0.201) (0.287) (0.327) (0.329) (0.256) (0.296) (0.271)
% Foreign Partners t
-0.017 -0.013 -0.008 -0.012
0.045
0.021
0.071
(0.054) (0.073) (0.080) (0.080) (0.065) (0.073) (0.067)
% Joint Ventures t
-0.006 -0.028 -0.040 -0.039 -0.126
0.005 -0.130
(0.104) (0.162) (0.179) (0.178) (0.143) (0.160) (0.145)
% Strategic Alliances t
-0.020
0.010
0.034
0.031
0.013
0.005
0.028
(0.044) (0.062) (0.070) (0.070) (0.055) (0.064) (0.058)
Acquisitions
0.024*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.014* 0.024***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
-0.026
-0.674
1.552***
0.678
Function Exploration t
(0.474)
(0.652) (0.442)
(0.552)
-0.678
Function Exploration t2
0.233
0.916 -1.464***
(0.504)
(0.449)
(0.591) (0.419)
3.873* 1.485
Structure Exploration t
-5.348** -5.506**
(1.988) (1.989)
(1.882) (1.763)
Structure Exploration t2
3.154** 3.265**
-2.215† -0.686
(1.216) (1.217)
(1.148) (1.075)
***
-5.367***
Firm Size t x Function Exploration t
-6.433
(0.353)
(0.283)
4.789***
Firm Size t x Function Exploration t2
6.624***
(0.380)
(0.296)
***
***
Firm Size t x Structure Exploration t
-13.71 -4.683
(0.840) (0.958)
***
Firm Size t x Structure Exploration t2
7.944*** 1.994
(0.523) (0.591)
AR(1) Parameter
0.655
0.594
0.574
0.572
0.393
0.516
0.409
N Firm-Years
2072
1748
1651
1651
1748
1651
1651
N Firms
339
327
320
320
327
320
320
VIF
1.896
2.937
5.876
7.722
7.129
78.69
136.1
-2Log Likelihood
774.2
892.1
910.1
907.0
480.1
572.7
261.3
*
*
***
***
∆ -2LL
1.1
7.4
10.5
413.1
344.8
656.2***
Exploration variables predicted from first-stage model. Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, *** p < .001
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TABLE 4
Fixed Effects Panel AR(1) Second-Stage Models for Firm Market Value – Balance Across Domains
Dependent Variable:
Market Value t+1
Net Profit t+1
Model Model
Model
Model
Model
Model
Model
1MV
8 MV
9 MV
10 MV
1NP
8 NP
9NP
Intercept
2.216
6.942
-32.05*
16.67*
0.176
0.258
-1.081
(4.285) (8.309) (12.77) (7.159)
(0.292)
(0.430)
(0.733)
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Firm Size t
3.115*** 3.141*** 3.072*** -71.89*** -0.329*** -0.308*** -0.309***
(0.164) (0.186) (0.186) (3.132)
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.011)
Firm R&D Intensity t
-0.035 -0.089 -0.084
-0.035
-0.002
-0.001
-0.002
(0.142) (0.215) (0.215) (0.135)
(0.008)
(0.013)
(0.013)
Firm Solvency t
-0.015 -0.002 -0.005
-0.066*
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
(0.042) (0.053) (0.053) (0.030)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.003)
Size of Alliance Portfolio t
0.699*** 1.014*** 0.985*** 0.134
0.038*** 0.060*** 0.059***
(0.180) (0.245) (0.244) (0.135)
(0.010)
(0.014)
(0.014)
Alliance Age t
-0.162
0.159
0.099
-0.009
-0.014
0.008
0.006
(0.340) (0.433) (0.431) (0.249)
(0.018)
(0.024)
(0.024)
Partners per Alliance t
-0.512† -0.934* -0.919*
0.245
-0.027†
-0.063** -0.062**
(0.295) (0.370) (0.368) (0.204)
(0.016)
(0.021)
(0.021)
Agreements per Alliance t
-3.259 -4.443 -3.927
-4.864
-0.332
-0.521
-0.507
(3.664) (5.651) (5.623) (3.053)
(0.201)
(0.329)
(0.328)
% Foreign Partners t
-0.701 -1.211 -1.228
-0.448
-0.017
-0.006
-0.006
(0.955) (1.385) (1.378) (0.753)
(0.054)
(0.081)
(0.080)
*
*
**
% Joint Ventures t
-3.029 -6.695 -6.290
-5.309
-0.006
-0.066
-0.045
(1.874) (3.061) (3.044) (1.631)
(0.104)
(0.178)
(0.178)
% Strategic Alliances t
0.924
2.099* 2.402*
1.735** -0.020
0.019
0.030
(0.785) (1.197) (1.193) (0.638)
(0.044)
(0.070)
(0.070)
Acquisitions
0.699*** 0.863*** 0.869*** 0.080
0.024*** 0.029*** 0.029***
(0.104) (0.123) (0.123) (0.075)
(0.005)
(0.007)
(0.007)
Function Exploration t
8.635† 84.47*** -39.58***
0.233
2.862**
(4.819) (19.49) (11.20)
(0.277)
(1.091)
*
*
*
Structure Exploration t
-12.96
30.83
-0.233
1.276†
-16.40
(5.553) (19.49) (7.045)
(0.681)
(0.311)
Function Exploration t ×
-2.928*
-84.39*** 42.06***
Structure Exploration t
(21.03) (12.10)
(1.175)
***
Firm Size t x Function Exploration t
170.07
(4.591)
Firm Size t x Structure Exploration t
78.66***
(3.283)
Firm Size t x Function Exploration t x
-188.7***
Structure Exploration t
(4.929)
AR(1) Parameter
0.437
0.395
0.389
0.134
0.655
0.575
0.571
N Firm-Years
2041
1674
1674
1674
2072
1651
1651
N Firms
339
320
320
320
339
320
320
VIF
1.699
2.317
6.269
34.78
1.896
2.356
6.152
-2Log Likelihood
12427.3 10470.8 10454.8 8545.7
774.2
916.2
910.0
∆ -2LL
9.5**
25.5***
1934.6***
1.3
24.1†
Exploration variables predicted from first-stage model. Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Model
10 NP
0.043
(0.606)
Included
-2.617***
(0.277)
-0.002
(0.011)
-0.004
(0.003)
0.040***
(0.012)
0.015
(0.020)
-0.054**
(0.018)
-0.395
(0.268)
0.042
(0.066)
-0.176
(0.143)
0.030
(0.057)
0.022***
(0.006)
-0.533
(0.932)
0.068
(0.582)
0.788
(1.006)
6.314***
(0.406)
3.074***
(0.291)
-8.277***
(0.437)
0.404
1651
320
34.56
229.3
688.2***
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TABLE 5
Summary of Results
Dependent Variable:
H1 Balance within
(a) Function domain ( ∪ )
(a) Structure domain ( ∪ )
H2 Balance across domains
(negative interaction)
H3 Size moderation of balance within
(a) Function domain (Æ U )
(a) Structure domain (Æ U )
H4 Balance across domains
(negative three-way interaction)

Market Value

Net Profit

Partial support (linear term n.s.)
Supported
Supported

n.s.
Supported
Supported

Supported
Supported
Supported

Supported
Supported
Partial support
(unmoderated terms n.s.)
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TABLE 6
Fixed Effects Panel AR(1) First-Stage Tobit Models for Function/Structure Exploration

Intercept
Firm Fixed Effects
Year 1990
Year 1991
Year 1992
Year 1993
Year 1994
Year 1995
Year 1996
Year 1997
Year 1998
Year 1999
Year 2000
Year 2001
Firm Size t-1
Firm Age 2001
Firm R&D Intensity t-1
Firm Solvency t-1
Partnering Experience t-1
Function Explor. Experience t-1

Function
Exploration t
1.073***
(0.227)
Included
0.087
(0.084)
0.081
(0.057)
0.095†
(0.050)
0.015
(0.043)
0.062
(0.039)
0.085*
(0.034)
0.124***
(0.029)
0.105***
(0.028)
0.045†
(0.024)
0.039†
(0.024)
0.037
(0.023)
-0.001
(0.008)
-0.005
(0.025)
-0.012
(0.008)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.259***
(0.045)

Structure Explor. Experience t-1
AR(1) Parameter
N Firm-Years
N Firms
-2Log Likelihood

-0.069
1820
330
271.9

Structure
Exploration t
1.524***
(0.185)
Included
0.316***
(0.060)
0.216***
(0.040)
0.101**
(0.033)
0.049†
(0.029)
0.093***
(0.025)
0.026
(0.022)
0.056**
(0.019)
0.056**
(0.015)
0.008
(0.015)
-0.000
(0.014)
-0.001
(0.015)
0.002
(0.005)
-0.004
(0.019)
0.004
(0.005)
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.001*
(0.000)
-0.601***
(0.085)
-0.124
1722
322
1431.5

Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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FIGURE 1
Impact of Balance Within the Function and Structure Domains on Market Value and Net Profit

Balance
Within
Domains

30

800

20
Firm Net Profit

Firm Market Value

1000

Balance
Within
Domains

600
400
200

10
0
-10

0
20

-20
20

15

1

15

0.8

10

0.6
0.4

5
0

Firm Size

1
0.6
0.4

5

0.2
0

0.8

10

Function Exploration

0

Firm Size

0.2
0

Function Exploration

Model 5: Balance within the function domain
Balance
Within
Domains

50

0

3000

Firm Net Profit

Firm Market Value

4000

Balance
Within
Domains

2000
1000
0
20

-50

-100

-150
20

15

1
0.8

10

0.6

1

0.2
0

0

0.8

10

0.6
0.4

5

0.4

5
Firm Size

15

Firm Size

Structure Exploration

0.2
0

0

Structure Exploration

Model 6: Balance within the structure domain

42

FIGURE 2
Impact of Balance Across the Function and Structure Domains on Market Value and Net Profit
Min-sized Firm

Min-sized Firm

Balance
Across
Domains

0.5

790

Firm Net Profit

Firm Market Value

800

Balance
Across
Domains

780

0

-0.5

770

-1
1

760
1

0.8
1
0.6

0.5

0.6

0.8

0

Structure Exploration

Function Exploration

1

0.6
0.2

0.2

0

Structure Exploration

0.8

0.4

0.4

0

0.4

0.2
0

Function Exploration

Model 10: Balance across domains (min-sized firm)
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